memfd_create — create an anonymous file
#include <sys/memfd.h>
int
memfd_create( |
const char *name, |
unsigned int flags) ; |
Note | |
---|---|
There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES. |
memfd_create
() creates an
anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to
it. The file behaves like a regular file, and so can be
modified, truncated, memory-mapped, and so on. However,
unlike a regular file, it lives in RAM and has a volatile
backing storage. Once all references to the file are dropped,
it is automatically released. Anonymous memory is used for
all backing pages of the file. Therefore, files created by
memfd_create
() have the same
semantics as other anonymous memory allocations such as those
allocated using mmap(2) with the
MAP_ANONYMOUS
flag.
The initial size of the file is set to 0. Following the call, the file size should be set using ftruncate(2). (Alternatively, the file may be populated by calls to write(2) or similar.)
The name supplied in name
is used as a filename and
will be displayed as the target of the corresponding symbolic
link in the directory /proc/self/fd/
. The displayed name is
always prefixed with memfd:
and serves only for
debugging purposes. Names do not affect the behavior of the
file descriptor, and as such multiple files can have the same
name without any side effects.
The following values may be bitwise ORed in flags
to change the behavior of
memfd_create
():
MFD_CLOEXEC
Set the close-on-exec (FD_CLOEXEC
) flag on the new file
descriptor. See the description of the O_CLOEXEC
flag in open(2) for reasons
why this may be useful.
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
Allow sealing operations on this file. See the
discussion of the F_ADD_SEALS
and F_GET_SEALS
operations in fcntl(2), and also
NOTES, below. The initial set of seals is empty. If
this flag is not set, the initial set of seals will be
F_SEAL_SEAL
, meaning that
no other seals can be set on the file.
Unused bits in flags
must be 0.
As its return value, memfd_create
() returns a new file
descriptor that can be used to refer to the file. This file
descriptor is opened for both reading and writing
(O_RDWR
) and O_LARGEFILE
is set for the file
descriptor.
With respect to fork(2) and execve(2), the usual
semantics apply for the file descriptor created by
memfd_create
(). A copy of the
file descriptor is inherited by the child produced by
fork(2) and refers to the
same file. The file descriptor is preserved across execve(2), unless the
close-on-exec flag has been set.
On success, memfd_create
()
returns a new file descriptor. On error, −1 is returned
and errno
is set to indicate the
error.
The address in name
points to invalid
memory.
An unsupported value was specified in one of the
arguments: flags
included unknown
bits, or name
was too long.
The per-process limit on the number of open file descriptors has been reached.
The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached.
There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file.
Glibc does not provide a wrapper for this system call; call it using syscall(2).
The memfd_create
() system
call provides a simple alternative to manually mounting a
tmpfs
filesystem
and creating and opening a file in that filesystem. The
primary purpose of memfd_create
() is to create files and
associated file descriptors that are used with the
file-sealing APIs provided by fcntl(2).
The memfd_create
() system
call also has uses without file sealing (which is why
file-sealing is disabled, unless explicitly requested with
the MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
flag). In
particular, it can be used as an alternative to creating
files in tmp
or as
an alternative to using the open(2) O_TMPFILE
in cases where there is no
intention to actually link the resulting file into the
filesystem.
In the absence of file sealing, processes that
communicate via shared memory must either trust each other,
or take measures to deal with the possibility that an
untrusted peer may manipulate the shared memory region in
problematic ways. For example, an untrusted peer might
modify the contents of the shared memory at any time, or
shrink the shared memory region. The former possibility
leaves the local process vulnerable to
time-of-check-to-time-of-use race conditions (typically
dealt with by copying data from the shared memory region
before checking and using it). The latter possibility
leaves the local process vulnerable to SIGBUS
signals when an attempt is made to
access a now-nonexistent location in the shared memory
region. (Dealing with this possibility necessitates the use
of a handler for the SIGBUS
signal.)
Dealing with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on code that employs shared memory. Memory sealing enables that extra complexity to be eliminated, by allowing a process to operate secure in the knowledge that its peer can't modify the shared memory in an undesired fashion.
An example of the usage of the sealing mechanism is as follows:
The first process creates a tmpfs
file using
memfd_create
(). The
call yields a file descriptor used in subsequent
steps.
The first process sizes the file created in the previous step using ftruncate(2), maps it using mmap(2), and populates the shared memory with the desired data.
The first process uses the fcntl(2)
F_ADD_SEALS
operation
to place one or more seals on the file, in order to
restrict further modifications on the file. (If
placing the seal F_SEAL_WRITE
, then it will be
necessary to first unmap the shared writable mapping
created in the previous step.)
A second process obtains a file descriptor for the
tmpfs
file
and maps it. Among the possible ways in which this
could happen are the following:
The process that called
memfd_create
() could transfer the resulting file descriptor to the second process via a UNIX domain socket (see unix(7) and cmsg(3)). The second process then maps the file using mmap(2).The second process is created via fork(2) and thus automatically inherits the file descriptor and mapping. (Note that in this case and the next, there is a natural trust relationship between the two processes, since they are running under the same user ID. Therefore, file sealing would not normally be necessary.)
The second process opens the file
/proc/<pid>/fd/<fd>
, where<pid>
is the PID of the first process (the one that calledmemfd_create
()), and<fd>
is the number of the file descriptor returned by the call tomemfd_create
() in that process. The second process then maps the file using mmap(2).
The second process uses the fcntl(2)
F_GET_SEALS
operation
to retrieve the bit mask of seals that has been
applied to the file. This bit mask can be inspected
in order to determine what kinds of restrictions have
been placed on file modifications. If desired, the
second process can apply further seals to impose
additional restrictions (so long as the F_SEAL_SEAL
seal has not yet been
applied).
Below are shown two example programs that demonstrate the
use of memfd_create
() and the
file sealing API.
The first program, t_memfd_create.c
, creates a tmpfs
file using memfd_create
(), sets a size for the file,
maps it into memory, and optionally places some seals on the
file. The program accepts up to three command-line arguments,
of which the first two are required. The first argument is
the name to associate with the file, the second argument is
the size to be set for the file, and the optional third
argument is a string of characters that specify seals to be
set on file.
The second program, t_get_seals.c
, can be used to open an
existing file that was created via memfd_create
() and inspect the set of seals
that have been applied to that file.
The following shell session demonstrates the use of these
programs. First we create a tmpfs
file and set some seals
on it:
$ ./t_memfd_create my_memfd_file 4096 sw & [1] 11775 PID: 11775; fd: 3; /proc/11775/fd/3
At this point, the t_memfd_create
program
continues to run in the background. From another program, we
can obtain a file descriptor for the file created by
memfd_create
() by opening the
/proc/PID/fd
file that
corresponds to the file descriptor opened by memfd_create
(). Using that pathname, we
inspect the content of the /proc/PID/fd
symbolic link, and use our
t_get_seals
program
to view the seals that have been placed on the file:
$ readlink /proc/11775/fd/3 /memfd:my_memfd_file (deleted) $ ./t_get_seals /proc/11775/fd/3 Existing seals: WRITE SHRINK
#include <sys/memfd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \ } while (0) int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; unsigned int seals; char *addr; char *name, *seals_arg; ssize_t len; if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "%s name size [seals]\n", argv[0]); fprintf(stderr, "\t'seals' can contain any of the " "following characters:\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\t\tg − F_SEAL_GROW\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\t\ts − F_SEAL_SHRINK\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\t\tw − F_SEAL_WRITE\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\t\tS − F_SEAL_SEAL\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } name = argv[1]; len = atoi(argv[2]); seals_arg = argv[3]; /* Create an anonymous file in tmpfs; allow seals to be placed on the file */ fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); if (fd == −1) errExit("memfd_create"); /* Size the file as specified on the command line */ if (ftruncate(fd, len) == −1) errExit("truncate"); printf("PID: %ld; fd: %d; /proc/%ld/fd/%d\n", (long) getpid(), fd, (long) getpid(), fd); /* Code to map the file and populate the mapping with data omitted */ /* If a 'seals' command−line argument was supplied, set some seals on the file */ if (seals_arg != NULL) { seals = 0; if (strchr(seals_arg, 'g') != NULL) seals |= F_SEAL_GROW; if (strchr(seals_arg, 's') != NULL) seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK; if (strchr(seals_arg, 'w') != NULL) seals |= F_SEAL_WRITE; if (strchr(seals_arg, 'S') != NULL) seals |= F_SEAL_SEAL; if (fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals) == −1) errExit("fcntl"); } /* Keep running, so that the file created by memfd_create() continues to exist */ pause(); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); }
#include <sys/memfd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \ } while (0) int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; unsigned int seals; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "%s /proc/PID/fd/FD\n", argv[0]); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR); if (fd == −1) errExit("open"); seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS); if (seals == −1) errExit("fcntl"); printf("Existing seals:"); if (seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) printf(" SEAL"); if (seals & F_SEAL_GROW) printf(" GROW"); if (seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) printf(" WRITE"); if (seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK) printf(" SHRINK"); printf("\n"); /* Code to map the file and access the contents of the resulting mapping omitted */ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); }
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