ptrace — process trace
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
long
ptrace( |
enum __ptrace_request request, |
pid_t pid, | |
void *addr, | |
void *data) ; |
The ptrace
() system call
provides a means by which one process (the "tracer") may
observe and control the execution of another process (the
"tracee"), and examine and change the tracee's memory and
registers. It is primarily used to implement breakpoint
debugging and system call tracing.
A tracee first needs to be attached to the tracer. Attachment and subsequent commands are per thread: in a multithreaded process, every thread can be individually attached to a (potentially different) tracer, or left not attached and thus not debugged. Therefore, "tracee" always means "(one) thread", never "a (possibly multithreaded) process". Ptrace commands are always sent to a specific tracee using a call of the form
ptrace(PTRACE_foo, pid, ...)
where pid
is the
thread ID of the corresponding Linux thread.
(Note that in this page, a "multithreaded process" means a
thread group consisting of threads created using the
clone(2) CLONE_THREAD
flag.)
A process can initiate a trace by calling fork(2) and having the
resulting child do a PTRACE_TRACEME
, followed (typically) by an
execve(2). Alternatively,
one process may commence tracing another process using
PTRACE_ATTACH
or PTRACE_SEIZE
.
While being traced, the tracee will stop each time a
signal is delivered, even if the signal is being ignored. (An
exception is SIGKILL
, which has
its usual effect.) The tracer will be notified at its next
call to waitpid(2) (or one of the
related "wait" system calls); that call will return a
status
value
containing information that indicates the cause of the stop
in the tracee. While the tracee is stopped, the tracer can
use various ptrace requests to inspect and modify the tracee.
The tracer then causes the tracee to continue, optionally
ignoring the delivered signal (or even delivering a different
signal instead).
If the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
option is not in effect, all successful calls to execve(2) by the traced
process will cause it to be sent a SIGTRAP
signal, giving the parent a chance
to gain control before the new program begins execution.
When the tracer is finished tracing, it can cause the
tracee to continue executing in a normal, untraced mode via
PTRACE_DETACH
.
The value of request
determines the action
to be performed:
PTRACE_TRACEME
Indicate that this process is to be traced by its
parent. A process probably shouldn't make this request
if its parent isn't expecting to trace it. (pid
, addr
, and data
are ignored.)
The PTRACE_TRACEME
request is used only by the tracee; the remaining
requests are used only by the tracer. In the following
requests, pid
specifies the thread ID of the tracee to be acted on.
For requests other than PTRACE_ATTACH
, PTRACE_SEIZE
, PTRACE_INTERRUPT
, and PTRACE_KILL
, the tracee must be
stopped.
PTRACE_PEEKTEXT
, PTRACE_PEEKDATA
Read a word at the address addr
in the tracee's
memory, returning the word as the result of the
ptrace
() call. Linux does
not have separate text and data address spaces, so
these two requests are currently equivalent.
(data
is
ignored; but see NOTES.)
PTRACE_PEEKUSER
Read a word at offset addr
in the tracee's USER
area, which holds the registers and other information
about the process (see <
sys/user.h
>
The word is returned as the
result of the ptrace
()
call. Typically, the offset must be word-aligned,
though this might vary by architecture. See NOTES.
(data
is
ignored; but see NOTES.)
PTRACE_POKETEXT
, PTRACE_POKEDATA
Copy the word data
to the address
addr
in the
tracee's memory. As for PTRACE_PEEKTEXT
and PTRACE_PEEKDATA
, these two requests
are currently equivalent.
PTRACE_POKEUSER
Copy the word data
to offset addr
in the tracee's USER
area. As for PTRACE_PEEKUSER
, the offset must
typically be word-aligned. In order to maintain the
integrity of the kernel, some modifications to the USER
area are disallowed.
PTRACE_GETREGS
, PTRACE_GETFPREGS
Copy the tracee's general-purpose or floating-point
registers, respectively, to the address data
in the tracer. See
<
sys/user.h
>
for information on the format of
this data. (addr
is ignored.) Note
that SPARC systems have the meaning of data
and addr
reversed; that is,
data
is ignored
and the registers are copied to the address addr
. PTRACE_GETREGS
and PTRACE_GETFPREGS
are not present on
all architectures.
PTRACE_GETREGSET
(since Linux
2.6.34)Read the tracee's registers. addr
specifies, in an
architecture-dependent way, the type of registers to be
read. NT_PRSTATUS
(with
numerical value 1) usually results in reading of
general-purpose registers. If the CPU has, for example,
floating-point and/or vector registers, they can be
retrieved by setting addr
to the corresponding
NT_foo
constant. data
points to a struct
iovec, which describes the destination
buffer's location and length. On return, the kernel
modifies iov.len
to indicate the
actual number of bytes returned.
PTRACE_SETREGS
, PTRACE_SETFPREGS
Modify the tracee's general-purpose or
floating-point registers, respectively, from the
address data
in
the tracer. As for PTRACE_POKEUSER
, some general-purpose
register modifications may be disallowed. (addr
is ignored.) Note
that SPARC systems have the meaning of data
and addr
reversed; that is,
data
is ignored
and the registers are copied from the address
addr
.
PTRACE_SETREGS
and
PTRACE_SETFPREGS
are not
present on all architectures.
PTRACE_SETREGSET
(since Linux
2.6.34)Modify the tracee's registers. The meaning of
addr
and
data
is
analogous to PTRACE_GETREGSET
.
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
(since Linux
2.3.99-pre6)Retrieve information about the signal that caused
the stop. Copy a siginfo_t
structure (see sigaction(2)) from
the tracee to the address data
in the tracer.
(addr
is
ignored.)
PTRACE_SETSIGINFO
(since Linux
2.3.99-pre6)Set signal information: copy a siginfo_t structure from the address
data
in the
tracer to the tracee. This will affect only signals
that would normally be delivered to the tracee and were
caught by the tracer. It may be difficult to tell these
normal signals from synthetic signals generated by
ptrace
() itself.
(addr
is
ignored.)
PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO
(since Linux
3.10)Retrieve siginfo_t
structures without removing signals from a queue.
addr
points to
a ptrace_peeksiginfo_args
structure that specifies the ordinal position from
which copying of signals should start, and the number
of signals to copy. siginfo_t
structures are copied into the buffer pointed to by
data
. The
return value contains the number of copied signals
(zero indicates that there is no signal corresponding
to the specified ordinal position). Within the returned
siginfo
structures, the si_code
field includes
information (__SI_CHLD
,
__SI_FAULT
, etc.) that
are not otherwise exposed to user space.
struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args { u64 off
; /* Ordinal position in queue at which
to start copying signals */u32 flags
; /* PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED or 0 */s32 nr
; /* Number of signals to copy */};
Currently, there is only one flag, PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED
, for dumping
signals from the process-wide signal queue. If this flag is
not set, signals are read from the per-thread queue of the
specified thread.
PTRACE_GETSIGMASK
(since Linux 3.11)Place a copy of the mask of blocked signals (see sigprocmask(2)) in the buffer pointed to by
data
, which should be a pointer to a buffer of type sigset_t. Theaddr
argument contains the size of the buffer pointed to bydata
(i.e.,sizeof(sigset_t)
).PTRACE_SETSIGMASK
(since Linux 3.11)Change the mask of blocked signals (see sigprocmask(2)) to the value specified in the buffer pointed to by
data
, which should be a pointer to a buffer of type sigset_t. Theaddr
argument contains the size of the buffer pointed to bydata
(i.e.,sizeof(sigset_t)
).PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
(since Linux 2.4.6; see BUGS for caveats)Set ptrace options from
data
. (addr
is ignored.)data
is interpreted as a bit mask of options, which are specified by the following flags:
PTRACE_O_EXITKILL
(since Linux 3.8)If a tracer sets this flag, a
SIGKILL
signal will be sent to every tracee if the tracer exits. This option is useful for ptrace jailers that want to ensure that tracees can never escape the tracer's control.PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE
(since Linux 2.5.46)Stop the tracee at the next clone(2) and automatically start tracing the newly cloned process, which will start with a
SIGSTOP
, orPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
ifPTRACE_SEIZE
was used. A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return astatus
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE<<8))The PID of the new process can be retrieved with
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.This option may not catch clone(2) calls in all cases. If the tracee calls clone(2) with the
CLONE_VFORK
flag,PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK
will be delivered instead ifPTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK
is set; otherwise if the tracee calls clone(2) with the exit signal set toSIGCHLD
,PTRACE_EVENT_FORK
will be delivered ifPTRACE_O_TRACEFORK
is set.PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
(since Linux 2.5.46)Stop the tracee at the next execve(2). A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return a
status
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC<<8))If the execing thread is not a thread group leader, the thread ID is reset to thread group leader's ID before this stop. Since Linux 3.0, the former thread ID can be retrieved with
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT
(since Linux 2.5.60)Stop the tracee at exit. A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return a
status
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT<<8))The tracee's exit status can be retrieved with
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.The tracee is stopped early during process exit, when registers are still available, allowing the tracer to see where the exit occurred, whereas the normal exit notification is done after the process is finished exiting. Even though context is available, the tracer cannot prevent the exit from happening at this point.
PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK
(since Linux 2.5.46)Stop the tracee at the next fork(2) and automatically start tracing the newly forked process, which will start with a
SIGSTOP
, orPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
ifPTRACE_SEIZE
was used. A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return astatus
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_FORK<<8))The PID of the new process can be retrieved with
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD
(since Linux 2.4.6)When delivering system call traps, set bit 7 in the signal number (i.e., deliver
SIGTRAP|0x80
). This makes it easy for the tracer to distinguish normal traps from those caused by a system call. (PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD
may not work on all architectures.)PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK
(since Linux 2.5.46)Stop the tracee at the next vfork(2) and automatically start tracing the newly vforked process, which will start with a
SIGSTOP
, orPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
ifPTRACE_SEIZE
was used. A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return astatus
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK<<8))The PID of the new process can be retrieved with
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE
(since Linux 2.5.60)Stop the tracee at the completion of the next vfork(2). A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return a
status
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE<<8))The PID of the new process can (since Linux 2.6.18) be retrieved with
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
(since Linux 3.5)Stop the tracee when a seccomp(2)
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
rule is triggered. A waitpid(2) by the tracer will return astatus
value such thatstatus>>8 == (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP<<8))While this triggers a
PTRACE_EVENT
stop, it is similar to a syscall-enter-stop, in that the tracee has not yet entered the syscall that seccomp triggered on. The seccomp event message data (from theSECCOMP_RET_DATA
portion of the seccomp filter rule) can be retrieved withPTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP
(since Linux 4.3)Suspend the tracee's seccomp protections. This applies regardless of mode, and can be used when the tracee has not yet installed seccomp filters. That is, a valid use case is to suspend a tracee's seccomp protections before they are installed by the tracee, let the tracee install the filters, and then clear this flag when the filters should be resumed. Setting this option requires that the tracer have the
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability, not have any seccomp protections installed, and not havePTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP
set on itself.PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
(since Linux 2.5.46)Retrieve a message (as an unsigned long) about the ptrace event that just happened, placing it at the address
data
in the tracer. ForPTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
, this is the tracee's exit status. ForPTRACE_EVENT_FORK
,PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK
,PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE
, andPTRACE_EVENT_CLONE
, this is the PID of the new process. ForPTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
, this is the seccomp(2) filter'sSECCOMP_RET_DATA
associated with the triggered rule. (addr
is ignored.)PTRACE_CONT
Restart the stopped tracee process. If
data
is nonzero, it is interpreted as the number of a signal to be delivered to the tracee; otherwise, no signal is delivered. Thus, for example, the tracer can control whether a signal sent to the tracee is delivered or not. (addr
is ignored.)PTRACE_SYSCALL
,PTRACE_SINGLESTEP
Restart the stopped tracee as for
PTRACE_CONT
, but arrange for the tracee to be stopped at the next entry to or exit from a system call, or after execution of a single instruction, respectively. (The tracee will also, as usual, be stopped upon receipt of a signal.) From the tracer's perspective, the tracee will appear to have been stopped by receipt of aSIGTRAP
. So, forPTRACE_SYSCALL
, for example, the idea is to inspect the arguments to the system call at the first stop, then do anotherPTRACE_SYSCALL
and inspect the return value of the system call at the second stop. Thedata
argument is treated as forPTRACE_CONT
. (addr
is ignored.)PTRACE_SYSEMU
,PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP
(since Linux 2.6.14)For
PTRACE_SYSEMU
, continue and stop on entry to the next system call, which will not be executed. ForPTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP
, do the same but also singlestep if not a system call. This call is used by programs like User Mode Linux that want to emulate all the tracee's system calls. Thedata
argument is treated as forPTRACE_CONT
. Theaddr
argument is ignored. These requests are currently supported only on x86.PTRACE_LISTEN
(since Linux 3.4)Restart the stopped tracee, but prevent it from executing. The resulting state of the tracee is similar to a process which has been stopped by a
SIGSTOP
(or other stopping signal). See the "group-stop" subsection for additional information.PTRACE_LISTEN
works only on tracees attached byPTRACE_SEIZE
.PTRACE_KILL
Send the tracee a
SIGKILL
to terminate it. (addr
anddata
are ignored.)This operation is deprecated; do not use it! Instead, send a
SIGKILL
directly using kill(2) or tgkill(2). The problem withPTRACE_KILL
is that it requires the tracee to be in signal-delivery-stop, otherwise it may not work (i.e., may complete successfully but won't kill the tracee). By contrast, sending aSIGKILL
directly has no such limitation.PTRACE_INTERRUPT
(since Linux 3.4)Stop a tracee. If the tracee is running or sleeping in kernel space and
PTRACE_SYSCALL
is in effect, the system call is interrupted and syscall-exit-stop is reported. (The interrupted system call is restarted when the tracee is restarted.) If the tracee was already stopped by a signal andPTRACE_LISTEN
was sent to it, the tracee stops withPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
andWSTOPSIG(status)
returns the stop signal. If any other ptrace-stop is generated at the same time (for example, if a signal is sent to the tracee), this ptrace-stop happens. If none of the above applies (for example, if the tracee is running in user space), it stops withPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
withWSTOPSIG(status)
==SIGTRAP
.PTRACE_INTERRUPT
only works on tracees attached byPTRACE_SEIZE
.PTRACE_ATTACH
Attach to the process specified in
pid
, making it a tracee of the calling process. The tracee is sent aSIGSTOP
, but will not necessarily have stopped by the completion of this call; use waitpid(2) to wait for the tracee to stop. See the "Attaching and detaching" subsection for additional information. (addr
anddata
are ignored.)Permission to perform a
PTRACE_ATTACH
is governed by a ptrace access modePTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS
check; see below.PTRACE_SEIZE
(since Linux 3.4)Attach to the process specified in
pid
, making it a tracee of the calling process. UnlikePTRACE_ATTACH
,PTRACE_SEIZE
does not stop the process. Group-stops are reported asPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
andWSTOPSIG(status)
returns the stop signal. Automatically attached children stop withPTRACE_EVENT_STOP
andWSTOPSIG(status)
returnsSIGTRAP
instead of havingSIGSTOP
signal delivered to them. execve(2) does not deliver an extraSIGTRAP
. Only aPTRACE_SEIZE
d process can acceptPTRACE_INTERRUPT
andPTRACE_LISTEN
commands. The "seized" behavior just described is inherited by children that are automatically attached usingPTRACE_O_TRACEFORK
,PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK
, andPTRACE_O_TRACECLONE
.addr
must be zero.data
contains a bit mask of ptrace options to activate immediately.Permission to perform a
PTRACE_SEIZE
is governed by a ptrace access modePTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS
check; see below.PTRACE_DETACH
Restart the stopped tracee as for
PTRACE_CONT
, but first detach from it. Under Linux, a tracee can be detached in this way regardless of which method was used to initiate tracing. (addr
is ignored.)
When a (possibly multithreaded) process receives a
killing signal (one whose disposition is set to
SIG_DFL
and whose default
action is to kill the process), all threads exit. Tracees
report their death to their tracer(s). Notification of this
event is delivered via waitpid(2).
Note that the killing signal will first cause
signal-delivery-stop (on one tracee only), and only after
it is injected by the tracer (or after it was dispatched to
a thread which isn't traced), will death from the signal
happen on all
tracees within a multithreaded process. (The term
"signal-delivery-stop" is explained below.)
SIGKILL
does not generate
signal-delivery-stop and therefore the tracer can't
suppress it. SIGKILL
kills
even within system calls (syscall-exit-stop is not
generated prior to death by SIGKILL
). The net effect is that
SIGKILL
always kills the
process (all its threads), even if some threads of the
process are ptraced.
When the tracee calls _exit(2), it reports its death to its tracer. Other threads are not affected.
When any thread executes exit_group(2), every tracee in its thread group reports its death to its tracer.
If the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT
option is on, PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
will happen before
actual death. This applies to exits via exit(2), exit_group(2), and signal
deaths (except SIGKILL
,
depending on the kernel version; see BUGS below), and when
threads are torn down on execve(2) in a
multithreaded process.
The tracer cannot assume that the ptrace-stopped tracee
exists. There are many scenarios when the tracee may die
while stopped (such as SIGKILL
). Therefore, the tracer must be
prepared to handle an ESRCH
error on any ptrace operation. Unfortunately, the same
error is returned if the tracee exists but is not
ptrace-stopped (for commands which require a stopped
tracee), or if it is not traced by the process which issued
the ptrace call. The tracer needs to keep track of the
stopped/running state of the tracee, and interpret
ESRCH as "tracee died
unexpectedly" only if it knows that the tracee has been
observed to enter ptrace-stop. Note that there is no
guarantee that waitpid(WNOHANG)
will
reliably report the tracee's death status if a ptrace
operation returned ESRCH.
waitpid(WNOHANG)
may return 0 instead. In other words, the tracee may be
"not yet fully dead", but already refusing ptrace
requests.
The tracer can't assume that the tracee always
ends its life by
reporting WIFEXITED(status)
or
WIFSIGNALED(status)
; there
are cases where this does not occur. For example, if a
thread other than thread group leader does an execve(2), it disappears;
its PID will never be seen again, and any subsequent ptrace
stops will be reported under the thread group leader's
PID.
A tracee can be in two states: running or stopped. For
the purposes of ptrace, a tracee which is blocked in a
system call (such as read(2), pause(2), etc.) is
nevertheless considered to be running, even if the tracee
is blocked for a long time. The state of the tracee after
PTRACE_LISTEN
is somewhat of
a gray area: it is not in any ptrace-stop (ptrace commands
won't work on it, and it will deliver waitpid(2)
notifications), but it also may be considered "stopped"
because it is not executing instructions (is not
scheduled), and if it was in group-stop before PTRACE_LISTEN
, it will not respond to
signals until SIGCONT
is
received.
There are many kinds of states when the tracee is stopped, and in ptrace discussions they are often conflated. Therefore, it is important to use precise terms.
In this manual page, any stopped state in which the
tracee is ready to accept ptrace commands from the tracer
is called ptrace-stop
. Ptrace-stops
can be further subdivided into signal-delivery-stop
,
group-stop
,
syscall-stop
, and
so on. These stopped states are described in detail
below.
When the running tracee enters ptrace-stop, it notifies its tracer using waitpid(2) (or one of the other "wait" system calls). Most of this manual page assumes that the tracer waits with:
pid = waitpid(pid_or_minus_1, &status, __WALL);
Ptrace-stopped tracees are reported as returns with
pid
greater than 0
and WIFSTOPPED(status)
true.
The __WALL
flag does not
include the WSTOPPED
and
WEXITED
flags, but implies
their functionality.
Setting the WCONTINUED
flag when calling waitpid(2) is not
recommended: the "continued" state is per-process and
consuming it can confuse the real parent of the tracee.
Use of the WNOHANG
flag
may cause waitpid(2) to return 0
("no wait results available yet") even if the tracer knows
there should be a notification. Example:
errno = 0; ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); if (errno == ESRCH) { /* tracee is dead */ r = waitpid(tracee, &status, __WALL | WNOHANG); /* r can still be 0 here! */ }
The following kinds of ptrace-stops exist:
signal-delivery-stops, group-stops, PTRACE_EVENT
stops, syscall-stops. They
all are reported by waitpid(2) with
WIFSTOPPED(status)
true. They may be differentiated by examining the value
status>>8
,
and if there is ambiguity in that value, by querying
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
.
Note | |
---|---|
The |
When a (possibly multithreaded) process receives any
signal except SIGKILL
, the
kernel selects an arbitrary thread which handles the
signal. (If the signal is generated with tgkill(2), the target
thread can be explicitly selected by the caller.) If the
selected thread is traced, it enters signal-delivery-stop.
At this point, the signal is not yet delivered to the
process, and can be suppressed by the tracer. If the tracer
doesn't suppress the signal, it passes the signal to the
tracee in the next ptrace restart request. This second step
of signal delivery is called signal injection in this manual
page. Note that if the signal is blocked,
signal-delivery-stop doesn't happen until the signal is
unblocked, with the usual exception that SIGSTOP
can't be blocked.
Signal-delivery-stop is observed by the tracer as
waitpid(2) returning with
WIFSTOPPED(status)
true,
with the signal returned by WSTOPSIG(status)
. If the
signal is SIGTRAP
, this may
be a different kind of ptrace-stop; see the "Syscall-stops"
and "execve" sections below for details. If WSTOPSIG(status)
returns a
stopping signal, this may be a group-stop; see below.
After signal-delivery-stop is observed by the tracer, the tracer should restart the tracee with the call
ptrace(PTRACE_restart, pid, 0, sig)
where PTRACE_restart
is one of
the restarting ptrace requests. If sig
is 0, then a signal is
not delivered. Otherwise, the signal sig
is delivered. This
operation is called signal
injection in this manual page, to distinguish
it from signal-delivery-stop.
The sig
value
may be different from the WSTOPSIG(status)
value: the
tracer can cause a different signal to be injected.
Note that a suppressed signal still causes system calls
to return prematurely. In this case, system calls will be
restarted: the tracer will observe the tracee to reexecute
the interrupted system call (or restart_syscall(2) system
call for a few system calls which use a different mechanism
for restarting) if the tracer uses PTRACE_SYSCALL
. Even system calls (such
as poll(2)) which are not
restartable after signal are restarted after signal is
suppressed; however, kernel bugs exist which cause some
system calls to fail with EINTR even though no observable signal
is injected to the tracee.
Restarting ptrace commands issued in ptrace-stops other
than signal-delivery-stop are not guaranteed to inject a
signal, even if sig
is nonzero. No error is
reported; a nonzero sig
may simply be ignored.
Ptrace users should not try to "create a new signal" this
way: use tgkill(2) instead.
The fact that signal injection requests may be ignored when restarting the tracee after ptrace stops that are not signal-delivery-stops is a cause of confusion among ptrace users. One typical scenario is that the tracer observes group-stop, mistakes it for signal-delivery-stop, restarts the tracee with
ptrace(PTRACE_restart, pid, 0, stopsig)
with the intention of injecting stopsig
, but stopsig
gets ignored and
the tracee continues to run.
The SIGCONT
signal has a
side effect of waking up (all threads of) a group-stopped
process. This side effect happens before
signal-delivery-stop. The tracer can't suppress this side
effect (it can only suppress signal injection, which only
causes the SIGCONT
handler to
not be executed in the tracee, if such a handler is
installed). In fact, waking up from group-stop may be
followed by signal-delivery-stop for signal(s) other than SIGCONT
, if they were pending when
SIGCONT
was delivered. In
other words, SIGCONT
may be
not the first signal observed by the tracee after it was
sent.
Stopping signals cause (all threads of) a process to enter group-stop. This side effect happens after signal injection, and therefore can be suppressed by the tracer.
In Linux 2.4 and earlier, the SIGSTOP
signal can't be injected.
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
can be
used to retrieve a siginfo_t
structure which corresponds to the delivered signal.
PTRACE_SETSIGINFO
may be used
to modify it. If PTRACE_SETSIGINFO
has been used to alter
siginfo_t, the si_signo
field and the
sig
parameter in
the restarting command must match, otherwise the result is
undefined.
When a (possibly multithreaded) process receives a
stopping signal, all threads stop. If some threads are
traced, they enter a group-stop. Note that the stopping
signal will first cause signal-delivery-stop (on one tracee
only), and only after it is injected by the tracer (or
after it was dispatched to a thread which isn't traced),
will group-stop be initiated on all
tracees within the
multithreaded process. As usual, every tracee reports its
group-stop separately to the corresponding tracer.
Group-stop is observed by the tracer as waitpid(2) returning with
WIFSTOPPED(status)
true,
with the stopping signal available via WSTOPSIG(status)
. The same
result is returned by some other classes of ptrace-stops,
therefore the recommended practice is to perform the
call
ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, pid, 0, &siginfo)
The call can be avoided if the signal is not
SIGSTOP
, SIGTSTP
, SIGTTIN
, or SIGTTOU
; only these four signals are
stopping signals. If the tracer sees something else, it
can't be a group-stop. Otherwise, the tracer needs to call
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
. If
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
fails with
EINVAL, then it is
definitely a group-stop. (Other failure codes are possible,
such as ESRCH ("no such
process") if a SIGKILL
killed
the tracee.)
If tracee was attached using PTRACE_SEIZE
, group-stop is indicated by
PTRACE_EVENT_STOP
:
status>>16 ==
PTRACE_EVENT_STOP. This allows detection of
group-stops without requiring an extra PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
call.
As of Linux 2.6.38, after the tracer sees the tracee
ptrace-stop and until it restarts or kills it, the tracee
will not run, and will not send notifications (except
SIGKILL
death) to the tracer,
even if the tracer enters into another waitpid(2) call.
The kernel behavior described in the previous paragraph
causes a problem with transparent handling of stopping
signals. If the tracer restarts the tracee after
group-stop, the stopping signal is effectively
ignored—the tracee doesn't remain stopped, it runs.
If the tracer doesn't restart the tracee before entering
into the next waitpid(2), future
SIGCONT
signals will not be
reported to the tracer; this would cause the SIGCONT
signals to have no effect on the
tracee.
Since Linux 3.4, there is a method to overcome this
problem: instead of PTRACE_CONT
, a PTRACE_LISTEN
command can be used to
restart a tracee in a way where it does not execute, but
waits for a new event which it can report via waitpid(2) (such as when
it is restarted by a SIGCONT
).
If the tracer sets PTRACE_O_TRACE_*
options,
the tracee will enter ptrace-stops called PTRACE_EVENT
stops.
PTRACE_EVENT
stops are
observed by the tracer as waitpid(2) returning with
WIFSTOPPED(status)
, and
WSTOPSIG(status)
returns SIGTRAP
. An
additional bit is set in the higher byte of the status
word: the value status>>8
will be
(SIGTRAP | PTRACE_EVENT_foo << 8).
The following events exist:
PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK
Stop before return from vfork(2) or
clone(2) with the
CLONE_VFORK
flag. When
the tracee is continued after this stop, it will wait
for child to exit/exec before continuing its
execution (in other words, the usual behavior on
vfork(2)).
PTRACE_EVENT_FORK
Stop before return from fork(2) or
clone(2) with the
exit signal set to SIGCHLD
.
PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE
Stop before return from clone(2).
PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE
Stop before return from vfork(2) or
clone(2) with the
CLONE_VFORK
flag, but
after the child unblocked this tracee by exiting or
execing.
For all four stops described above, the stop occurs in
the parent (i.e., the tracee), not in the newly created
thread. PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
can be used to retrieve the new thread's ID.
PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
Stop before return from execve(2). Since
Linux 3.0, PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
returns the
former thread ID.
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
Stop before exit (including death from exit_group(2)),
signal death, or exit caused by execve(2) in a
multithreaded process. PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
returns the exit
status. Registers can be examined (unlike when "real"
exit happens). The tracee is still alive; it needs to
be PTRACE_CONT
ed or
PTRACE_DETACH
ed to
finish exiting.
PTRACE_EVENT_STOP
Stop induced by PTRACE_INTERRUPT
command, or
group-stop, or initial ptrace-stop when a new child
is attached (only if attached using PTRACE_SEIZE
).
PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
Stop triggered by a seccomp(2) rule on
tracee syscall entry when PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
has been set
by the tracer. The seccomp event message data (from
the SECCOMP_RET_DATA
portion of the seccomp filter rule) can be retrieved
with PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
.
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
on
PTRACE_EVENT
stops returns
SIGTRAP
in si_signo
, with si_code
set to (event<<8) | SIGTRAP.
If the tracee was restarted by PTRACE_SYSCALL
, the tracee enters
syscall-enter-stop just prior to entering any system call.
If the tracer restarts the tracee with PTRACE_SYSCALL
, the tracee enters
syscall-exit-stop when the system call is finished, or if
it is interrupted by a signal. (That is,
signal-delivery-stop never happens between
syscall-enter-stop and syscall-exit-stop; it happens
after
syscall-exit-stop.)
Other possibilities are that the tracee may stop in a
PTRACE_EVENT
stop, exit (if
it entered _exit(2) or exit_group(2)), be killed
by SIGKILL
, or die silently
(if it is a thread group leader, the execve(2) happened in
another thread, and that thread is not traced by the same
tracer; this situation is discussed later).
Syscall-enter-stop and syscall-exit-stop are observed by
the tracer as waitpid(2) returning with
WIFSTOPPED(status)
true,
and WSTOPSIG(status)
giving
SIGTRAP
. If the PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD
option was set by
the tracer, then WSTOPSIG(status)
will give
the value (SIGTRAP |
0x80).
Syscall-stops can be distinguished from
signal-delivery-stop with SIGTRAP
by querying PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
for the following
cases:
si_code
<=
0SIGTRAP
was
delivered as a result of a user-space action, for
example, a system call (tgkill(2),
kill(2), sigqueue(3), etc.),
expiration of a POSIX timer, change of state on a
POSIX message queue, or completion of an asynchronous
I/O request.
si_code
== SI_KERNEL
(0x80
)SIGTRAP
was sent by
the kernel.
si_code
== SIGTRAP or si_code ==
(SIGTRAP|0x80
)This is a syscall-stop.
However, syscall-stops happen very often (twice per
system call), and performing PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
for every syscall-stop
may be somewhat expensive.
Some architectures allow the cases to be distinguished
by examining registers. For example, on x86, rax
== -ENOSYS in syscall-enter-stop. Since
SIGTRAP
(like any other
signal) always happens after
syscall-exit-stop,
and at this point rax
almost never contains
-ENOSYS, the SIGTRAP
looks like "syscall-stop which is
not syscall-enter-stop"; in other words, it looks like a
"stray syscall-exit-stop" and can be detected this way. But
such detection is fragile and is best avoided.
Using the PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD
option is the
recommended method to distinguish syscall-stops from other
kinds of ptrace-stops, since it is reliable and does not
incur a performance penalty.
Syscall-enter-stop and syscall-exit-stop are
indistinguishable from each other by the tracer. The tracer
needs to keep track of the sequence of ptrace-stops in
order to not misinterpret syscall-enter-stop as
syscall-exit-stop or vice versa. The rule is that
syscall-enter-stop is always followed by syscall-exit-stop,
PTRACE_EVENT
stop or the
tracee's death; no other kinds of ptrace-stop can occur in
between.
If after syscall-enter-stop, the tracer uses a
restarting command other than PTRACE_SYSCALL
, syscall-exit-stop is not
generated.
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
on
syscall-stops returns SIGTRAP
in si_signo
, with
si_code
set to
SIGTRAP
or (SIGTRAP|0x80)
.
[Details of these kinds of stops are yet to be documented.]
Most ptrace commands (all except PTRACE_ATTACH
, PTRACE_SEIZE
, PTRACE_TRACEME
, PTRACE_INTERRUPT
, and PTRACE_KILL
) require the tracee to be in
a ptrace-stop, otherwise they fail with ESRCH.
When the tracee is in ptrace-stop, the tracer can read and write data to the tracee using informational commands. These commands leave the tracee in ptrace-stopped state:
ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKTEXT/PEEKDATA/PEEKUSER, pid, addr, 0); ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT/POKEDATA/POKEUSER, pid, addr, long_val); ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS/GETFPREGS, pid, 0, &struct); ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS/SETFPREGS, pid, 0, &struct); ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_foo, &iov); ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_foo, &iov); ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, pid, 0, &siginfo); ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO, pid, 0, &siginfo); ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, pid, 0, &long_var); ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_flags);
Note that some errors are not reported. For example,
setting signal information (siginfo
) may have no effect
in some ptrace-stops, yet the call may succeed (return 0
and not set errno
); querying
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
may
succeed and return some random value if current ptrace-stop
is not documented as returning a meaningful event
message.
The call
ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_flags);
affects one tracee. The tracee's current flags are
replaced. Flags are inherited by new tracees created and
"auto-attached" via active PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK
, PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK
, or PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE
options.
Another group of commands makes the ptrace-stopped tracee run. They have the form:
ptrace(cmd, pid, 0, sig);
where cmd
is
PTRACE_CONT
, PTRACE_LISTEN
, PTRACE_DETACH
, PTRACE_SYSCALL
, PTRACE_SINGLESTEP
, PTRACE_SYSEMU
, or PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP
. If the tracee
is in signal-delivery-stop, sig
is the signal to be
injected (if it is nonzero). Otherwise, sig
may be ignored. (When
restarting a tracee from a ptrace-stop other than
signal-delivery-stop, recommended practice is to always
pass 0 in sig
.)
A thread can be attached to the tracer using the call
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
or
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_flags);
PTRACE_ATTACH
sends
SIGSTOP
to this thread. If
the tracer wants this SIGSTOP
to have no effect, it needs to suppress it. Note that if
other signals are concurrently sent to this thread during
attach, the tracer may see the tracee enter
signal-delivery-stop with other signal(s) first! The usual
practice is to reinject these signals until SIGSTOP
is seen, then suppress
SIGSTOP
injection. The design
bug here is that a ptrace attach and a concurrently
delivered SIGSTOP
may race
and the concurrent SIGSTOP
may be lost.
Since attaching sends SIGSTOP
and the tracer usually suppresses
it, this may cause a stray EINTR return from the currently
executing system call in the tracee, as described in the
"Signal injection and suppression" section.
Since Linux 3.4, PTRACE_SEIZE
can be used instead of
PTRACE_ATTACH
. PTRACE_SEIZE
does not stop the attached
process. If you need to stop it after attach (or at any
other time) without sending it any signals, use
PTRACE_INTERRUPT
command.
The request
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0);
turns the calling thread into a tracee. The thread
continues to run (doesn't enter ptrace-stop). A common
practice is to follow the PTRACE_TRACEME
with
raise(SIGSTOP);
and allow the parent (which is our tracer now) to observe our signal-delivery-stop.
If the PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK
,
PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK
, or
PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE
options
are in effect, then children created by, respectively,
vfork(2) or clone(2) with the
CLONE_VFORK
flag, fork(2) or clone(2) with the exit
signal set to SIGCHLD
, and
other kinds of clone(2), are
automatically attached to the same tracer which traced
their parent. SIGSTOP
is
delivered to the children, causing them to enter
signal-delivery-stop after they exit the system call which
created them.
Detaching of the tracee is performed by:
ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0, sig);
PTRACE_DETACH
is a
restarting operation; therefore it requires the tracee to
be in ptrace-stop. If the tracee is in
signal-delivery-stop, a signal can be injected. Otherwise,
the sig
parameter
may be silently ignored.
If the tracee is running when the tracer wants to detach
it, the usual solution is to send SIGSTOP
(using tgkill(2), to make sure
it goes to the correct thread), wait for the tracee to stop
in signal-delivery-stop for SIGSTOP
and then detach it (suppressing
SIGSTOP
injection). A design
bug is that this can race with concurrent SIGSTOP
s. Another complication is that
the tracee may enter other ptrace-stops and needs to be
restarted and waited for again, until SIGSTOP
is seen. Yet another complication
is to be sure that the tracee is not already
ptrace-stopped, because no signal delivery happens while it
is—not even SIGSTOP
.
If the tracer dies, all tracees are automatically
detached and restarted, unless they were in group-stop.
Handling of restart from group-stop is currently buggy, but
the "as planned" behavior is to leave tracee stopped and
waiting for SIGCONT
. If the
tracee is restarted from signal-delivery-stop, the pending
signal is injected.
When one thread in a multithreaded process calls execve(2), the kernel destroys all other threads in the process, and resets the thread ID of the execing thread to the thread group ID (process ID). (Or, to put things another way, when a multithreaded process does an execve(2), at completion of the call, it appears as though the execve(2) occurred in the thread group leader, regardless of which thread did the execve(2).) This resetting of the thread ID looks very confusing to tracers:
All other threads stop in PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
stop, if the
PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT
option was turned on. Then all other threads except
the thread group leader report death as if they
exited via _exit(2) with exit
code 0.
The execing tracee changes its thread ID while it is in the execve(2). (Remember, under ptrace, the "pid" returned from waitpid(2), or fed into ptrace calls, is the tracee's thread ID.) That is, the tracee's thread ID is reset to be the same as its process ID, which is the same as the thread group leader's thread ID.
Then a PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
stop happens, if
the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
option was turned on.
If the thread group leader has reported its
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
stop
by this time, it appears to the tracer that the dead
thread leader "reappears from nowhere".
Note | |
---|---|
The thread group leader does not report
death via |
If the thread group leader was still alive, for the tracer this may look as if thread group leader returns from a different system call than it entered, or even "returned from a system call even though it was not in any system call". If the thread group leader was not traced (or was traced by a different tracer), then during execve(2) it will appear as if it has become a tracee of the tracer of the execing tracee.
All of the above effects are the artifacts of the thread ID change in the tracee.
The PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
option is the recommended tool for dealing with this
situation. First, it enables PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
stop, which occurs
before execve(2) returns. In
this stop, the tracer can use PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
to retrieve the
tracee's former thread ID. (This feature was introduced in
Linux 3.0.) Second, the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
option disables legacy
SIGTRAP
generation on
execve(2).
When the tracer receives PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
stop notification, it
is guaranteed that except this tracee and the thread group
leader, no other threads from the process are alive.
On receiving the PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
stop notification, the
tracer should clean up all its internal data structures
describing the threads of this process, and retain only one
data structure—one which describes the single still
running tracee, with
thread ID == thread group ID == process ID.
Example: two threads call execve(2) at the same time:
*** we get syscall-enter-stop in thread 1: ** PID1 execve("/bin/foo", "foo" <unfinished ...> *** we issue PTRACE_SYSCALL for thread 1 ** *** we get syscall-enter-stop in thread 2: ** PID2 execve("/bin/bar", "bar" <unfinished ...> *** we issue PTRACE_SYSCALL for thread 2 ** *** we get PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC for PID0, we issue PTRACE_SYSCALL ** *** we get syscall-exit-stop for PID0: ** PID0 <... execve resumed> ) = 0
If the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
option is not
in
effect for the execing tracee, and if the tracee was
PTRACE_ATTACH
ed rather that
PTRACE_SEIZE
d, the kernel
delivers an extra SIGTRAP
to
the tracee after execve(2) returns. This
is an ordinary signal (similar to one which can be
generated by kill
-TRAP), not a special kind of ptrace-stop.
Employing PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
for this signal returns si_code
set to 0
(SI_USER
). This signal may be
blocked by signal mask, and thus may be delivered (much)
later.
Usually, the tracer (for example, strace(1)) would not want to
show this extra post-execve SIGTRAP
signal to the user, and would
suppress its delivery to the tracee (if SIGTRAP
is set to SIG_DFL
, it is a killing signal).
However, determining which
SIGTRAP
to suppress is not easy. Setting
the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
option
or using PTRACE_SEIZE
and
thus suppressing this extra SIGTRAP
is the recommended approach.
The ptrace API (ab)uses the standard UNIX parent/child signaling over waitpid(2). This used to cause the real parent of the process to stop receiving several kinds of waitpid(2) notifications when the child process is traced by some other process.
Many of these bugs have been fixed, but as of Linux 2.6.38 several still exist; see BUGS below.
As of Linux 2.6.38, the following is believed to work correctly:
exit/death by signal is reported first to the tracer, then, when the tracer consumes the waitpid(2) result, to the real parent (to the real parent only when the whole multithreaded process exits). If the tracer and the real parent are the same process, the report is sent only once.
On success, the PTRACE_PEEK*
requests return
the requested data (but see NOTES), while other requests
return zero.
On error, all requests return −1, and errno
is set appropriately. Since the value
returned by a successful PTRACE_PEEK*
request may be
−1, the caller must clear errno
before the call, and then check it
afterward to determine whether or not an error occurred.
(i386 only) There was an error with allocating or freeing a debug register.
There was an attempt to read from or write to an invalid area in the tracer's or the tracee's memory, probably because the area wasn't mapped or accessible. Unfortunately, under Linux, different variations of this fault will return EIO or EFAULT more or less arbitrarily.
An attempt was made to set an invalid option.
request
is
invalid, or an attempt was made to read from or write
to an invalid area in the tracer's or the tracee's
memory, or there was a word-alignment violation, or an
invalid signal was specified during a restart
request.
The specified process cannot be traced. This could
be because the tracer has insufficient privileges (the
required capability is CAP_SYS_PTRACE
); unprivileged
processes cannot trace processes that they cannot send
signals to or those running set-user-ID/set-group-ID
programs, for obvious reasons. Alternatively, the
process may already be being traced, or (on kernels
before 2.6.26) be init(1) (PID 1).
The specified process does not exist, or is not currently being traced by the caller, or is not stopped (for requests that require a stopped tracee).
Although arguments to ptrace
() are interpreted according to the
prototype given, glibc currently declares ptrace
() as a variadic function with only
the request
argument
fixed. It is recommended to always supply four arguments,
even if the requested operation does not use them, setting
unused/ignored arguments to 0L
or (void *) 0.
In Linux kernels before 2.6.26, init(1), the process with PID 1, may not be traced.
A tracees parent continues to be the tracer even if that tracer calls execve(2).
The layout of the contents of memory and the USER area are quite operating-system- and architecture-specific. The offset supplied, and the data returned, might not entirely match with the definition of struct user.
The size of a "word" is determined by the operating-system variant (e.g., for 32-bit Linux it is 32 bits).
This page documents the way the ptrace
() call works currently in Linux. Its
behavior differs significantly on other flavors of UNIX. In
any case, use of ptrace
() is
highly specific to the operating system and architecture.
Various parts of the kernel-user-space API (not just ptrace(2) operations), require so-called "ptrace access mode" checks, whose outcome determines whether an operation is permitted (or, in a few cases, causes a "read" operation to return sanitized data). These checks are performed in cases where one process can inspect sensitive information about, or in some cases modify the state of, another process. The checks are based on factors such as the credentials and capabilities of the two processes, whether or not the "target" process is dumpable, and the results of checks performed by any enabled Linux Security Module (LSM)—for example, SELinux, Yama, or Smack—and by the commoncap LSM (which is always invoked).
Prior to Linux 2.6.27, all access checks were of a single type. Since Linux 2.6.27, two access mode levels are distinguished:
PTRACE_MODE_READ
For "read" operations or other operations that are
less dangerous, such as: get_robust_list(2);
kcmp(2); reading
/proc/[pid]/auxv
,
/proc/[pid]/environ
, or
/proc/[pid]/stat
; or
readlink(2) of a
/proc/[pid]/ns/*
file.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
For "write" operations, or other operations that
are more dangerous, such as: ptrace attaching
(PTRACE_ATTACH
) to
another process or calling process_vm_writev(2).
(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
was
effectively the default before Linux 2.6.27.)
Since Linux 4.5, the above access mode checks are combined (ORed) with one of the following modifiers:
PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS
Use the caller's filesystem UID and GID (see credentials(7)) or effective capabilities for LSM checks.
PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS
Use the caller's real UID and GID or permitted capabilities for LSM checks. This was effectively the default before Linux 4.5.
Because combining one of the credential modifiers with one of the aforementioned access modes is typical, some macros are defined in the kernel sources for the combinations:
PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
Defined as PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS.
PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS
Defined as PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS
Defined as PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS
Defined as PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS.
One further modifier can be ORed with the access mode:
PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT
(since Linux
3.3)Don't audit this access mode check. This modifier
is employed for ptrace access mode checks (such as
checks when reading /proc/[pid]/stat
) that merely cause
the output to be filtered or sanitized, rather than
causing an error to be returned to the caller. In
these cases, accessing the file is not a security
violation and there is no reason to generate a
security audit record. This modifier suppresses the
generation of such an audit record for the particular
access check.
Note that all of the PTRACE_MODE_*
constants
described in this subsection are kernel-internal, and not
visible to user space. The constant names are mentioned
here in order to label the various kinds of ptrace access
mode checks that are performed for various system calls and
accesses to various pseudofiles (e.g., under /proc
). These names are used in other
manual pages to provide a simple shorthand for labeling the
different kernel checks.
The algorithm employed for ptrace access mode checking
determines whether the calling process is allowed to
perform the corresponding action on the target process. (In
the case of opening /proc/[pid]
files, the "calling process"
is the one opening the file, and the process with the
corresponding PID is the "target process".) The algorithm
is as follows:
If the calling thread and the target thread are in the same thread group, access is always allowed.
If the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS
, then, for the
check in the next step, employ the caller's
filesystem UID and GID. (As noted in credentials(7), the
filesystem UID and GID almost always have the same
values as the corresponding effective IDs.)
Otherwise, the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS
, so use the
caller's real UID and GID for the checks in the next
step. (Most APIs that check the caller's UID and GID
use the effective IDs. For historical reasons, the
PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS
check uses the real IDs instead.)
Deny access if neither
of the
following is true:
The real, effective, and saved-set user IDs of the target match the caller's user ID,
and
the real, effective, and saved-set group IDs of the target match the caller's group ID.The caller has the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability in the user namespace of the target.
Deny access if the target process "dumpable"
attribute has a value other than 1 (SUID_DUMP_USER
; see the discussion
of PR_SET_DUMPABLE
in
prctl(2)), and the
caller does not have the CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability in the
user namespace of the target process.
The kernel LSM security_ptrace_access_check
()
interface is invoked to see if ptrace access is
permitted. The results depend on the LSM(s). The
implementation of this interface in the commoncap LSM
performs the following steps:
If the access mode includes
PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS
, then use the caller'seffective
capability set in the following check; otherwise (the access mode specifiesPTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS
, so) use the caller'spermitted
capability set.Deny access if
neither
of the following is true:
The caller and the target process are in the same user namespace, and the caller's capabilities are a proper superset of the target process's
permitted
capabilities.The caller has the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability in the target process's user namespace.Note that the commoncap LSM does not distinguish between
PTRACE_MODE_READ
andPTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
.
If access has not been denied by any of the preceding steps, then access is allowed.
On systems with the Yama Linux Security Module (LSM)
installed (i.e., the kernel was configured with
CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
), the
/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope
file
(available since Linux 3.4) can be used to restrict the
ability to trace a process with ptrace(2) (and thus also
the ability to use tools such as strace(1) and gdb(1)). The goal of such
restrictions is to prevent attack escalation whereby a
compromised process can ptrace-attach to other sensitive
processes (e.g., a GPG agent or an SSH session) owned by
the user in order to gain additional credentials that may
exist in memory and thus expand the scope of the
attack.
More precisely, the Yama LSM limits two types of operations:
Any operation that performs a ptrace access mode
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
check—for example, ptrace
() PTRACE_ATTACH
. (See the "Ptrace
access mode checking" discussion above.)
ptrace
()
PTRACE_TRACEME
.
A process that has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability can update the
/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope
file
with one of the following values:
No additional restrictions on operations that
perform PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
checks (beyond
those imposed by the commoncap and other LSMs).
The use of PTRACE_TRACEME
is unchanged.
When performing an operation that requires a
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
check, the calling process must either have the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability in the user namespace of the target
process or it must have a predefined relationship
with the target process. By default, the predefined
relationship is that the target process must be a
descendant of the caller.
A target process can employ the prctl(2)
PR_SET_PTRACER
operation to declare an additional PID that is
allowed to perform PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
operations on
the target. See the kernel source file Documentation/security/Yama.txt
for
further details.
The use of PTRACE_TRACEME
is unchanged.
Only processes with the CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability in the
user namespace of the target process may perform
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
operations or trace children that employ PTRACE_TRACEME
.
No process may perform PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
operations or
trace children that employ PTRACE_TRACEME
.
Once this value has been written to the file, it cannot be changed.
With respect to values 1 and 2, note that creating a new
user namespace effectively removes the protection offered
by Yama. This is because a process in the parent user
namespace whose effective UID matches the UID of the
creator of a child namespace has all capabilities
(including CAP_SYS_PTRACE
)
when performing operations within the child user namespace
(and further-removed descendants of that namespace).
Consequently, when a process tries to use user namespaces
to sandbox itself, it inadvertently weakens the protections
offered by the Yama LSM.
At the system call level, the PTRACE_PEEKTEXT
, PTRACE_PEEKDATA
, and PTRACE_PEEKUSER
requests have a different
API: they store the result at the address specified by the
data
parameter, and
the return value is the error flag. The glibc wrapper
function provides the API given in DESCRIPTION above, with
the result being returned via the function return
value.
On hosts with 2.6 kernel headers, PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
is declared with a
different value than the one for 2.4. This leads to
applications compiled with 2.6 kernel headers failing when
run on 2.4 kernels. This can be worked around by redefining
PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
to
PTRACE_OLDSETOPTIONS
, if that
is defined.
Group-stop notifications are sent to the tracer, but not to real parent. Last confirmed on 2.6.38.6.
If a thread group leader is traced and exits by calling
_exit(2), a PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
stop will happen for it
(if requested), but the subsequent WIFEXITED
notification will not be
delivered until all other threads exit. As explained above,
if one of other threads calls execve(2), the death of the
thread group leader will never
be reported. If the
execed thread is not traced by this tracer, the tracer will
never know that execve(2) happened. One
possible workaround is to PTRACE_DETACH
the thread group leader
instead of restarting it in this case. Last confirmed on
2.6.38.6.
A SIGKILL
signal may still
cause a PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
stop
before actual signal death. This may be changed in the
future; SIGKILL
is meant to
always immediately kill tasks even under ptrace. Last
confirmed on Linux 3.13.
Some system calls return with EINTR if a signal was sent to a tracee,
but delivery was suppressed by the tracer. (This is very
typical operation: it is usually done by debuggers on every
attach, in order to not introduce a bogus SIGSTOP
). As of Linux 3.2.9, the following
system calls are affected (this list is likely incomplete):
epoll_wait(2), and
read(2) from an inotify(7) file descriptor.
The usual symptom of this bug is that when you attach to a
quiescent process with the command
strace −p <process-ID>
then, instead of the usual and expected one-line output such as
restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted call ...>_
or
select(6, [5], NULL, [5], NULL_
('_' denotes the cursor position), you observe more than one line. For example:
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, {15370, 690928118}) = 0 epoll_wait(4,_
What is not visible here is that the process was blocked in epoll_wait(2) before strace(1) has attached to it. Attaching caused epoll_wait(2) to return to user space with the error EINTR. In this particular case, the program reacted to EINTR by checking the current time, and then executing epoll_wait(2) again. (Programs which do not expect such "stray" EINTR errors may behave in an unintended way upon an strace(1) attach.)
gdb(1), strace(1), clone(2), execve(2), fork(2), gettid(2), prctl(2), seccomp(2), sigaction(2), tgkill(2), vfork(2), waitpid(2), exec(3), capabilities(7), signal(7)
This page is part of release 4.07 of the Linux man-pages
project. A
description of the project, information about reporting bugs,
and the latest version of this page, can be found at
https://www.kernel.org/doc/man−pages/.
Copyright (c) 1993 Michael Haardt <michaelmoria.de> Fri Apr 2 11:32:09 MET DST 1993 and changes Copyright (C) 1999 Mike Coleman (mkcacm.org) -- major revision to fully document ptrace semantics per recent Linux kernel (2.2.10) and glibc (2.1.2) Sun Nov 7 03:18:35 CST 1999 and Copyright (c) 2011, Denys Vlasenko <vda.linuxgooglemail.com> and Copyright (c) 2015, 2016, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpagesgmail.com> %%%LICENSE_START(GPLv2+_DOC_FULL) This is free documentation; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. The GNU General Public License's references to "object code" and "executables" are to be interpreted as the output of any document formatting or typesetting system, including intermediate and printed output. This manual is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this manual; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. %%%LICENSE_END Modified Fri Jul 23 23:47:18 1993 by Rik Faith <faithcs.unc.edu> Modified Fri Jan 31 16:46:30 1997 by Eric S. Raymond <esrthyrsus.com> Modified Thu Oct 7 17:28:49 1999 by Andries Brouwer <aebcwi.nl> Modified, 27 May 2004, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpagesgmail.com> Added notes on capability requirements 2006-03-24, Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226compuserve.com> Added PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, PTRACE_SETSIGINFO, PTRACE_SYSEMU, PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP (Thanks to Blaisorblade, Daniel Jacobowitz and others who helped.) 2011-09, major update by Denys Vlasenko <vda.linuxgooglemail.com> 2015-01, Kees Cook <keescookchromium.org> Added PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP FIXME The following are undocumented PTRACE_GETWMMXREGS ARM PTRACE_SETWMMXREGS ARM PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA Various architectures PTRACE_SET_THREAD_AREA Various architectures PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL ARM and ARM64 PTRACE_GETCRUNCHREGS ARM PTRACE_SETCRUNCHREGS ARM PTRACE_GETVFPREGS ARM and ARM64 PTRACE_SETVFPREGS ARM and ARM64 PTRACE_GETHBPREGS ARM and ARM64 PTRACE_SETHBPREGS ARM and ARM64 PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK Various architectures and others that can be found in the arch/*/include/uapi/asm/ptrace files |